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The “Blurred Lines” of Copyright Law
SETTING A NEW STANDARD FOR COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT IN MUSIC
INTRODUCTION
In 2014, a relatively obscure band, Spirit, sued rock legends
Led Zeppelin for copyright infringement. The musical world was
turned upside down, faced with the possibility that Led Zeppelin
had copied significant parts of its iconic 1971 song “Stairway to
Heaven” from the Spirit track “Taurus.”1 As many hoped, the jury
cleared the band of these allegations in 2016.2 Musicians Robin
Thicke and Pharrell Williams also found themselves in the same
position in 2013.MarvinGaye’s estate accused the pair of copyright
infringement, alleging that the hit song, “Blurred Lines,” copied
the Marvin Gaye song “Got to Give It Up.”3 Unlike the members of
Led Zeppelin, Thicke and Williams lost in 2015, and the Gaye
Estate was awarded roughly $3.5 million in damages along with a
royalty of 50 percent of revenues regarding songwriting and
publishing of “Blurred Lines”—which was awarded to mitigate the
original verdict of $7.4 million in damages.4
The different outcomes of these two cases raise
interesting questions about how copyright law is applied to music.
Based on the two rulings, one would assume that “Stairway to
Heaven” simply must not have sounded like “Taurus,” and
conversely, “Blurred Lines” must have sounded like “Got to Give It
Up.” Delving into the cases though, it becomes clear that it is not
that simple. Interestingly, the court itself found that “Stairway
1 Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, CV 15-3462 RGK (AGRx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
51006, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2016).
2 Skidmore, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51006, at *56; Kory Grow, Led Zeppelin Win
in ‘Stairway to Heaven’ Trial, ROLLING STONE (June 23, 2016), http://
www.rollingstone.com/music/news/led-zeppelin-prevail-in-stairway-to-heaven-lawsuit-201
60623 [https://perma.cc/3PTW-N4FD].
3 Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97262, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015).
4 Id. at *147 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015); Daniel Kreps, ‘Blurred Lines’ Ruling
Sliced to $5.3 Million, With a Catch, ROLLING STONE (July 15, 2015), http://
www.rollingstone.com/music/news/blurred-lines-ruling-sliced-to-5-3-million-with-a-catch-
20150715 [https://perma.cc/357R-QVTT].
290 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1
to Heaven” resembled “Taurus” a lot more clearly than “Blurred
Lines” resembled “Got to Give It Up.”5 Despite this, the jury
ruled the opposite way.6
Problematic legal tests lead to such uninformed,
subjective jury decisions in copyright infringement cases. To
succeed on a copyright infringement claim, a “plaintiff must
prove (1) ownership of the copyright; and (2) “infringement—that
the defendant copied protected elements of the plaintiff’s work.”7
Further, in determining infringement, a plaintiff must ultimately
prove that “defendant copied from plaintiff’s copyrighted work
and . . . that the copying (assuming it to be proved) went so far as
to constitute improper appropriation” of the work.8 Because a
plaintiff usually cannot provide direct evidence of copying, one
“may establish copying by showing that [the] defendant had
access to plaintiff’s work and that the two works are ‘substantially
similar’ in idea and in expression of the idea.”9
The circuits are torn and have their respective tests for
determining “substantial similarity.”10 The judges initially
evaluate the songs for similarities, taking into account factors
such as chord patterns, lyrics, melodies, and song structure.11
And if a case cannot be decided as a matter of law, the decision
falls to the jury, where the evaluation becomes more subjective.12
Regardless of how the circuits describe their tests, however, the
juries are instructed to take a more subjective point of view,
evaluating music on simply how it sounds.13
This note argues that due to constraints unique to the
musical medium, copyright infringement in music is deserving
of its own test, specifically one not based on the subjective
feelings of a jury. Music is unique. It is the only artistic medium
5 Compare Skidmore, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51006, at *50–51 (“While it is true
that a descending chromatic four-chord progression is a common convention that abounds in
the music industry, the similarities here transcend this core structure. For example, the
descending bass line in bothTaurus andStairway to Heaven appears at the beginning of both
songs, arguably the most recognizable and important segments.”), with Williams v.
Bridgeport Music, Inc., LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182240, at *54
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014) (finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact due to “a
sufficient disagreement” amongst the musical experts involved in the case (quoting Brown
Bus Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.3d 1465, 1472 (9th Cir. 1992)).
6 See Skidmore, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51006, at *51.
7 Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing
Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996)).
8 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
9 Smith, 84 F.3d at 1218 (quoting Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35
F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994)).
10 See infra Sections I.B–C.
11 See Skidmore, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51006, at *50–51.
12 See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977); Zeppelin, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51006, at *51.
13 See, e.g., id. at *49–51.
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that we can only hear, and if we interpret it differently, the legal
process in which we scrutinize it ought to be different as well.
Furthermore, analysis of music history and theory will reveal
that music is the most restrictive art form there is. While a novel
can consist of any arrangement of words and has unlimited
options for plot or character interaction, Western music is
limited to a twelve-note octave, thereby putting a hard cap on
chord structures, progressions, and possible arrangements.14
Additionally, musicians throughout the ages have drawn on
artists that came before them as influence,15 and a jury that is
given a vague and broad test to determine what is “copying,” can
easily confuse influence with copying.
Keeping these factors in mind, this note ultimately
argues that the current test interferes with the very nature of
copyright law. Though the circuits have different tests for what
constitutes copyright infringement, they can all agree that, at
the foundation of copyright law, “ideas” are not copyrightable,
only how they are expressed.16 The jury instructions, as they
stand now, allow for mere musical ideas17 to be confused with
copyrightable expression,18 which is precisely what occurred in
the Williams case. This note suggests a new test—the Unique
Quality Test—that will work to preserve artistic integrity as
well as the common practice of drawing from previous musicians’
influence without running into the issue of infringement.
Part I provides the foundations of copyright law and how it
has been applied to music in a variety of cases over the years. This
discussion illustrates how vague tests have led to inconsistent and
arbitrary rulings. Part II focuses on why music in particular should
have its own test. A new test is needed because people interpret
music differently and it is fundamentally limited as compared to
other artistic mediums. Furthermore, applications of the traditional
tests in other artistic forms highlight the flaws in applying the same
standards to music. Part III provides an in-depth analysis of the
14 See infra Section II.B.
15 See, e.g., METAL: A HEADBANGER’S JOURNEY (Seville Pictures 2005) (“Every
cool riff has already been written by Black Sabbath. Anything everyone else does is just
basically ripping it off. Either you’re playing it slightly different or fast or slow,
but . . . [t]hey did everything already.” (statement by musician Rob Zombie)), http://
www.imdb.com/title/tt0478209/quotes [https://perma.cc/XER9-PGXC].
16 See Mark Avsec, “Nonconventional” Music Analysis and “Disguised”
Infringement: CleverMusical Tricks to Divide the Wealth of Tin Pan Alley, 52 CLEVELAND
ST. L. REV. 339, 352–53 (2005).
17 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1880); see also infra note 28 (“[t]he
description of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no
foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself.”).
18 See infra note 28 (“The object of the one is explanation; the object of the other
is use. The former may be secured by copyright.”).
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Skidmore and Williams cases, noting the flaws with the legal
standards in light of a greater understanding of whymusic needs its
own test. Finally, Part IV introduces the Unique Quality Test,
exhibiting how it will better benefit the music industry as well as
hold up the foundational theories behind copyright law.
I. “YES, THERE ARE TWO PATHS YOU CANGO BY”19:
BACKGROUND ON THE SECOND ANDNINTH CIRCUIT
INFRINGEMENT TESTS
An understanding of the basic nature of copyright law as
it currently stands is important in order to realize how the courts
have hesitated to create clear and definite rules when it comes
to adjudicating a music infringement case. The following
Sections establish the foundations of copyright law and the
competing tests the Second and Ninth Circuits utilize when
deciding infringement cases. When paired with the conflicting
case law from each circuit, one can gain an understanding of why
a clearer legal test is needed.
A. Rules of Infringement in Copyright Law
Proof of infringement in a copyright case regarding music
is often based upon circumstantial evidence, and a plaintiff has
a number of things to prove.20 In an infringement case, “[a]
copyright plaintiff must prove (1) ownership of the copyright;
and (2) infringement—that the defendant copied protected
elements of the plaintiff’s work.”21 Due to the circumstantial
nature of these claims, direct evidence of copying is rarely
available.22 A plaintiff can establish copying, however, “by
showing that [the] defendant had access to plaintiff’s work and
that the two works are ‘substantially similar’ in idea and in
expression of the idea.”23
A plaintiff can show that a defendant had access to their
work by either establishing “a particular chain of events”
connecting “the plaintiff’s work and the defendant’s access to
that work,” or by showing that “the plaintiff ’s work has been
19 LEDZEPPELIN,Stairway toHeaven, onLEDZEPPELIN IV (Atlantic Records 1977).
20 Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, CV 15-3462 RGK (AGRx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
51006, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2016).
21 Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing
Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218, (9th Cir. 1996).
22 Id. at 481.
23 Smith, 84 F.3d at 1218 (quoting Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35
F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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widely disseminated.”24 Music experts can attest to a particular
chain of events, such as an artist sending a song to be used by a
recording company, and a plaintiff can “show that its work was
widely disseminated through sales of sheet music, records, and
radio performances” in the particular defendant’s region.25 Courts
have also noted that access “is sometimes accompanied by a theory
that copyright infringement of a popular song was subconscious.”26
Proving “substantial similarity” in regard to idea and
expression is where courts have been unable to develop a bright-
line approach, leading to a multitude of problems for artists.27 At
a fundamental level, copyright law has established that “ideas”
alone cannot be protected, but rather, the “expression” of those
ideas can be.28 This theory has been compromised in the music
world, however, by the courts’ unclear and varying positions on
judging “substantial similarity.”29 Remarkably, the courts have
purposely taken a vague approach to addressing this issue,
which has contributed to the overall ambiguous and unclear
nature of copyright law inmusic.30 Judge Learned Hand set forth
24 Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 482 (citations omitted).
25 Id. (citation omitted).
26 Id. For a further exploration of this point see infra Section I.D.
27 See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (“If copying is
established, then only does there arise the second issue, that of illicit copying (unlawful
appropriation). On that issue . . . the test is the response of the ordinary lay hearer;
accordingly, on that issue, ‘dissection’ and expert testimony are irrelevant.” (footnote
omitted)); Skidmore v. Zeppelin, CV 15-3462 RGK (AGRx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51006,
at *49 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2016) (“In analyzing musical compositions under the extrinsic
test, [the Ninth Circuit has] never announced a uniform set of factors to be used.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 2004));
Pyatt v. Raymond, 10 Civ. 8764 (CM), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55754, at *12 (S.D.N.Y.
May 19, 2011) (“[T]he [c]ourt is guided ‘by comparing the [work’s] total concept and
overall feel’ with that of the allegedly infringing work.’” (quoting Peter F. Gaito
Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 66 (2d Cir. 2010)).
28 See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[T]hat a whole work
is copyrighted does not mean that every element of it is copyrighted; copyright protection
extends only to those components of the work that are original to the creator.” (citing
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co, Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991));
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250–52 (1903) (In finding that
prints were copyrightable even when based on depictions of real life, the Court noted
“there is no reason to doubt that these prints in their ensemble and in all their details,
in their design and particular combinations of figures, lines, and colors, are the original
work of the plaintiffs’ designer.”); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S 53,
58–60 (1884) (In Burrow-Giles, the Court held that a photograph was copyrightable
because the piece was indicative of the “original mental conception” of the author, fitting
the requirement that “ideas in the mind of the author are given visible expression” in a
copyrightable work.); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105–07 (1880) (In finding that the
copyrightability of a bookkeeping system only extended to the description of said system
and not the system itself, the Court held that “[t]he description of the art in a book,
though entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to
the art itself. The object of the one is explanation; the object of the other is use. The
former may be secured by copyright.”).
29 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
30 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v.MartinWeiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
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that “[t]he test for infringement of a copyright is of necessity
vague,” purporting that wherever the line between an idea and
expression of that idea is drawn would seem arbitrary anyway.31
The circuit splits and case law that have followed are indicative
of this hesitance to define a clear line regarding infringement in
music. A greater understanding of the theory behind music itself
can help to inform the courts on how to clearly draw the line
between idea and expression when it comes to music, allowing
for a straight-forward approach for determining substantial
similarity between two musical works.
After determining whether a defendant actually copied the
work—something a plaintiff can prove through circumstantial
evidence and a judge may decide as a matter of law—the court
must then decide whether the defendant essentially copied too
much.32 The court must ultimately decide whether the works in
questions are “substantially similar,” something that would
constitute an “improper appropriation” of the work in question.33
Noted copyright scholar, Alan Latman, has observed that two
aspects of an infringement suit are often confused.34 Latman found
the Second Circuit’s language in Arnstein v. Porter “instructive,”
quoting Judge Frank’s conclusion that “[i]t is important to avoid
confusing two separate elements essential to a plaintiff’s case in
such a suit: (a) that defendant copied from plaintiff ’s copyrighted
work and (b) that the copying (assuming it to be proved) went so
far as to constitute improper appropriation.”35
Once copying has been established, the Second and Ninth
Circuits are split over how to properly address the latter
aspect—that the copying went so far as to constitute improper
appropriation—of the copyright infringement paradigm.36 The
Second Circuit test focuses on the determination of the “lay
listener[ ] ,”37 and the fact that some part of the defendant’s work
31 Id.; see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER&DAVIDNIMMER, NIMMERON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.03[A] (2011) (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics Inc., 274 F.2d at 489); infra Part V.
32 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
33 Alan Latman, Probative Similarity As Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling
Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1192 (1990) (quoting
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946)).
34 Id.
35 Id. (quoting Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468). To find an instance of copying, courts
have often found a reasonable inference upon a review of the “evidence of reasonable
access” to the work, the “chain of events” leading up to the alleged infringement, or how
widely disseminated the alleged infringed work was. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton,
212 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 2000); Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
36 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
37 See Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1990)
(“Under the facts before it, with a popular composition at issue, the Arnstein court
appropriately perceived “lay listeners” and the works’ “audience” to be the same”);
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473 (“The question, therefore, is whether defendant took from
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has to be substantially similar to the plaintiff ’s work to the
composer’s intended audience, which typically consists of the
average popular-music listener.38Meanwhile, theNinthCircuit uses
a two-pronged “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” analysis in determining
whether there is substantial similarity in the expression of the
works at hand.39 Despite the split, neither circuit has managed to
come up with a clear and determinative test, resulting in often
ambiguous or contradictory rulings and jury decisions.
B. The Second Circuit: Lay Listener Test
The Second Circuit introduced the lay listener test in
Arnstein v. Porter.40 The court established that, once copying has
been proven, the issue of “illicit copying (unlawful appropriation)”
arises and is something that occurs if the works are found to be
substantially similar.41 The test, according to the court, depends on
the response of the “ordinary lay hearer,” making the distinction
that analysis and dissection of the music is not relevant here, like
it is in the court’s determination of whether copying occurred.42
Unlike that initial determination, the court is only concerned with
how the lay listener interprets the sound of the music, noting that
“[t]he impression made on the refined ears of musical experts or
their views as to themusical excellence of plaintiff’s or defendant’s
works are utterly immaterial on the issue of misappropriation.”43
Arnstein highlights some major issues with how
copyright infringement of music has been interpreted and
adjudicated—issues that have manifested in the Williams and
Skidmore rulings. For one, the Second Circuit suggests that the
opinions of a musical expert as well as a proper analysis of the
features of a piece of music (such as chords, melodies, tone, and
more) are not relevant to the determination of the lay listener.44
This notion ultimately seems to rely on the assumption that
music ought to only be judged from an economic standpoint,
foregoing the artistic nature of the medium. Purporting that the
reaction of the lay listener is the deciding factor because the
success of the work depends on their consumption of it, seems to
plaintiff ’ s works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise
the audience for whom such popular music is composed.”).
38 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473; see also Avsec, supra note 16, at 348.
39 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
40 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473.
41 Id. at 468.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 473.
44 Id.
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suggest that music only exists for monetary purposes. This
assumption may stem from Judge Hand’s hesitance to draw a
line when it comes to substantial similarity and what constitutes
stealing the “expression” rather than the “ideas” behind the
piece.45 The courts, unable to establish that line, chose instead
to over-simplify the interpretation of music.46
A court’s hesitance to rule on music infringement as a
matter of law—whether copying actually occurred—is strongly
apparent in Repp v. Webber.47 In this case, musician Ray Repp
accused famous playwright Andrew Lloyd Webber of infringing
on Repp’s work, “Till You,” in his “Phantom of the Opera” song
from the eponymous musical.48 The court granted Webber’s
motion for summary judgment due to the fact that Repp had
failed to establish access and otherwise could not prove that the
pieces were so “strikingly similar” that an inference could be
justified to prove improper appropriation.49 This was even in
spite of the availability of the song and precedent finding
infringement with as little as subconscious copying.50
A comparison of the two songs, Repp’s “Till You” and
Webber’s “Phantom,” makes it clear that this ruling contradicts
that in ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., by failing
to consider subconscious copying.51 In ABKCO, the court found
that ex-Beatle George Harrison could have subconsciously stolen
the music to his song “My Sweet Lord,” making up for lack of
access.52 The Repp court, however, failed to find access despite
evidence that Repp’s song had been distributed and advertised.53
While the court found that this dissemination only reached a
limited audience, an argument can be made by comparing the
two songs that the similarities are in fact so striking that access
can be inferred.54 As in the two works in question in ABKCO, the
45 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 31, at § 13.03[A] (quoting Peter Pan
Fabrics, Inc., 274 F.2d at 489)).
46 See Infra Part II.
47 Repp v. Webber, 858 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
48 Id. at 1295.
49 Id. at 1303.
50 See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 997–98 (2d
Cir. 1982).
51 See Repp, 858 F. Supp. at 1301–03; compare RAY REPP, Till You, on
BENEDICAMUS (K&R Records 1978) at 0:25, with ANDREW LLOYDWEBBER,The Phantom
of the Opera, on THE PHANTOM OF THE OPERA (Polydor Records 1986) at 0:20; but see
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 997–98 (2d Cir. 1982).
(finding that Harrison’s access to the song was rather remote, with a small window of
popularity occurring years prior to the release ofMy Sweet Lord).
52 ABKCO, 722 F.2d at 997–98 (2d Cir. 1982).
53 Repp, 858 F. Supp. at 1301–03.
54 Id.
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songs at issue inRepp both feature a similar chord progression and
almost exact vocal melodies aligned overtop.55 In both cases, two
songs with arguably similar sound and melody were put to task,
but one defendant was found guilty of infringement and the other
was not, exhibiting how vague rules result in arbitrary decisions.
These unclear conclusions andmethodologies have persisted
into more recent music infringement cases. In Pyatt v. Raymond,
famous pop artists Usher and Alicia Keys were sued for
infringement, with Pyatt claiming that Usher’s hit song “Caught
Up” had stolen from the plaintiff’s own copyrighted work.56 Pyatt
offered up evidence of access, showing that the plaintiff had some
dealings with the same record company, MBK Entertainment, and
had initially been instructed to submit lyrics, songs, and more.57
After this, MBK decided to change the deal, asking for Pyatt’s
permission to use the songs for Usher’s upcoming album; the
plaintiff did not accept this deal.58 Despite rejecting the offer to
essentially become a writer for Usher, the plaintiff found that
Usher’s “Caught Up” strongly resembled Pyatt’s own song.59 With
this context in mind, both access and possible copying are plausible.
Despite this plausibility, the court, applying the lay listener
test, found that because the “total concept and overall feel”—
another vague approach to determining substantial similarity—of
the songs were different, the claim would be dismissed.60 The court
noted that the music of the two recordings was “entirely
dissimilar,” the vocals utilized different styles, and the lyrics had
little to no similarity.61 Ultimately, this led the court to conclude
that no “average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as
having been appropriated form the copyrighted work.”62
On its face, the court may have made the right call in
Pyatt v. Raymond. If the concept and feel of two works are
dissimilar, it is likely that infringement did not occur. When
applied against a defendant, however, the total concept and feel
model seems to interfere with the whole foundational thesis in
copyright law—that ideas cannot be copyrighted, but their
55 Compare RAY REPP, supra note 51 at 0:25, with ANDREW LLOYD WEBBER,
supra note 51, at 0:20.
56 Pyatt v. Raymond, 10 Civ. 8764 (CM), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55754, at *12
(S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2011).
57 Id. at *6.
58 Id. at *6–7.
59 Id.
60 Id. at *12 (quoting Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp.,
602 F.3d 57, 66 (2d Cir. 2010)).
61 Id. at *26.
62 Id. at *27 (quotingPeter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC, 602 F.3d at 66 (2d Cir. 2010)).
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expression can be.63 This note argues that the total concept and
feel of a song constitutes an idea rather than expression.64
Despite this point, it is worth noting that the total
concept and feel model does not even seem to be evenly applied
across the Second Circuit. For example, the court refrained from
sending the pieces in question to the jury in Pyatt v. Raymond,
but did so in New Old Music Group, Inc. v. Gottwald.65 The
plaintiff, New Old Music Group, alleged that the defendant had
stolen a drum part from Black Heat’s “Zimba Ku” and used it in
the Jessie J song “Price Tag.”66 To gain an understanding of the
drum part in question, the court broke down the composition,
finding that while the various rhythms on their own may not be
copyrightable, the sequencing of them may be.67 The court
ultimately concluded that based on the total concept and feel of the
drum elements in their featured sequence, the court could not, as
a matter of law, conclude that “‘the select[ion], coordinat[ion], and
arrange[ment]’ of these elements is so unoriginal that the Zimba
Ku drum part is not protectable,” and allowed the case to go to the
jury to further determine substantial similarity.68
Pyatt and New Old Music Group accentuate a number of
issues with judging music infringement by the total concept and
feel mechanism—something that is prevalent in the Bridgeport
ruling. For one, total concept and feel denotes the idea behind a
piece, not the expression of it.69 Furthermore, this particular
measure of whether copying actually occurred is not applied evenly
across the circuits. InPyatt, the court considered the lyrical content
and “overall musical impression” between the two works at issue
before coming to the conclusion that the pieces were so dissimilar
that a reasonable jury would not be able to conclude that the pieces
were substantially similar.70 However, in New Old Music Group,
the court would not rule as amatter of law over a simple drumbeat,
hearkening back to the hesitance to do so seen in previous cases
such as Repp.71 These different outcomes exhibit the vagueness of
total concept and feel—does it apply to the full song and entire
63 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
64 For further discussion see infra Part II.
65 Compare Pyatt v. Raymond, 10 Civ. 8764 (SM), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
55754, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2011), with New Old Music Group, Inc. v. Gottwald, 122
F. Supp. 3d 78, 94 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
66 New Old Music Group, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 3d at 82.
67 Id. at 95.
68 Id. at 95–98 (alteration in original) (quoting Velez v. Sony Discos, No. 05
Civ. 0615(PKC), 2007 WL 120686, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2007).
69 See infra Section III.C.
70 Pyatt, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55754, at *27.
71 New Old Music Group, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 3d, at 95–98; Repp v. Webber, 858
F. Supp. 1292, 1292–93 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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composition? To just a small part of a song?—a vagueness that is
inherent in how courts apply music infringement law.
C. The Ninth Circuit: Extrinsic and Intrinsic Analysis
Unlike the Second Circuit’s lay listener test, the Ninth
Circuit utilizes a two-pronged “extrinsic”—done by the court—
and “intrinsic”—done by the jury—analysis when deciding
whether a defendant ultimately infringed upon a copyrighted
work.72 The 1977 case, Sid & Marty Krofft Television
Productions Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., introduced the test.73 In
this case, which dealt with an infringement claim over the
alleged adaptation of the McDonald’s characters from a
copyrighted children’s television program, the court sought to
create a limiting principle in copyright law.74 Concerned with
preserving the difference between ideas and expression, the
court developed a principle that attempted “to reconcile two
competing social interests: rewarding an individual’s creativity
and effort while at the same time permitting the nation to enjoy
the benefits and progress from use of the same subject matter.”75
Responding directly to the Arnstein court—which
adapted the lay listener test in the Second Circuit—the court in
Sid set out to explicitly establish a test that would determine the
similarity of expression of ideas as opposed to just the ideas
themselves, albeit missing the mark.76 Regarding the test, the
court first looked at whether there was substantial similarity in
the ideas, helping to determine whether copying actually
occurred.77 The court stated that this is a factual test and is
called the extrinsic test.78 This aspect of the test depends “on
specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed,” for example
in an art piece; “the type of artwork involved, the materials used,
the subject matter, and the setting for the subject.”79 At this
72 See, e.g., Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 489 (9th Cir. 2000)
(affirming the trial court’s holding that Michael Bolton’s “Love Is a Wonderful Thing”
infringed on the Isley Brothers’ song of the same name); Sid & Marty Krofft Television
Prods v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1161, 1164, 1179 (9th Cir. 1977) (affirming
the district court holding where defendants had been found guilty of infringing a group
of children’s show characters); Straughter v. Raymond, Case No. CV 08-2170 CAS (CWx),
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93068 at *54–55 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011) (holding that there was
“a genuine issue of material fact as to whether” two songs were “substantially or
strikingly similar to protectable elements”).
73 See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods, 562 F.2d at 1164.
74 Id. at 1162–63.
75 Id. at 1163.
76 See id. at 1165; Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946).
77 Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc., 562 F.2d at 1164.
78 Id. (citations omitted).
79 Id.
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point, since the factual material is focused, expert testimony and
analytic dissection is key.80
Next, if there is substantial similarity in the ideas, then the
fact-findermust determine whether the same can be said about the
expression.81 This element is called the intrinsic test, and depends
“on the response of the ordinary reasonable person,” the jury.82 This
element is considered to be intrinsic because it does not rely on the
factual matter and analysis that is seen in the extrinsic portion of
the test.83 As exhibited by the conflicting outcomes of the Led
Zeppelin and Bridgeport cases, both of which were argued in the
Ninth Circuit, the extrinsic/intrinsic analysis is plagued by the
same shortcomings of the Second Circuit lay listener test.84
These issues appear in a case such as Straughter v.
Raymond.85 In this case, the artist Usher was accused of
infringement86 and the court addressed the difficulty of analyzing
a musical work specifically.87 Here, the court noted the many
factors that go into a musical composition, and how it is difficult to
balance factors that are not protectable under copyright law—such
as rhythm, melody, harmony, and phrasing—with elements that
are protected, such as musical expression.88 Despite highlighting
this issue, the court followed precedent set by Three Boys Music
Corp. v. Bolton, which states that the extrinsic test can be satisfied
by exhibiting copying of a “combination of unprotectable
elements.”89 Perhaps a large number of similarities would
suggest that copying occurred, but the court failed to show how
the aggregate of all copied, yet unprotectable elements when
viewed in isolation, can transcend the level of protection that is
given to expression rather than ideas. A group of combined ideas
that are not afforded protection under copyright law does not
necessarily lead to a certain kind of expression.90 This
uncertainty of the idea/expression dichotomy lends itself to the
disproportionate rulings seen later in Skidmore and Williams.91
Ultimately, the respective tests of the Second and Ninth
Circuits present issues specifically related to the analysis of
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. (citations omitted).
83 Id. at 1164 (citation omitted).
84 See infra Part III.
85 Straughter v. Raymond, Case No. CV 08-2170 CAS (CWx), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 93068 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011).
86 Id. at *3–4.
87 Id. at *5–7, 43.
88 Id. at *42–43.
89 Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000).
90 To be discussed in greater detail under theUniqueQuality Test.See infraPart IV.
91 See infra Part IV.
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music infringement.92 Those issues can be summed up as follows;
(1) The failure to “draw a line” between ideas and their expression
has led to uneven and inconsistent applications of the various tests
the courts use to determine infringement, (2) this has resulted in
either a hesitance to rule as a matter of law in some cases or an
over-eagerness to do so in others, and (3) courts find themselves
contradicting the fundamental idea versus expression dichotomy
by allowing rulings based on musical ideas anyway.
D. Further Issues: Subconscious Copying
Another aspect made available by the courts for proving
that copying has occurred is known as “subconscious copying.”93
The Second Circuit addressed this issue in both ABKCO Music
Inc. v. Harrisongs Music LTD94 and Three Boys Music Corp.95 In
Three Boys, a jury concluded that Michael Bolton’s “Love is a
Wonderful Thing” infringed on an Isley Brothers song that had
the same name.96 In affirming the jury decision, the court noted
that proof of access is “sometimes accompanied by [the] theory
that copyright infringement of a popular song was subconscious,”
asserting that copying can be found with no proof of any sort of
artistic intent to do so.97
The element of subconscious copying is particularly
troublesome in music. Ruling on an element like this interferes
with something that is essential to the creation of music—
musical influence. Rooted in tradition, musicians have always
been influenced by those that came before them, adopting
different styles, techniques, themes, and more from these artists
to create their own sound, or their own expression of a type of
music.98 While songs may sound similar on the surface, the
underlying compositions may be entirely different, something
often lost on courts and juries alike.99 A song may have a similar
beat to it—which would lend itself to the idea of a similar “total
concept and feel”—but there may be an entirely different
composition aside from that beat (the notes, chords, structure,
melodies, harmonies, and more).100 Entire genres of music are
92 Issues that this note’s proposedUnique Quality Test addresses. See infra Part IV
93 Three Boys Music Corp., 212 F.3d at 482–83.
94 ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1982).
95 Three Boys Music Corp., 212 F.3d at 482–83.
96 Id. at 480.
97 Id. at 482.
98 Avsec, supra note 16, at 352.
99 Margit Livingston and Joseph Urbinato, Copyright Infringement of Music:
DeterminingWhetherWhat Sounds Alike is Alike, 15 VAND. J.ENT.&TECH. L. 227, 228 (2013).
100 See infra Section II.B.
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built upon similar sounds, feelings, and types of music, and
something like subconscious copying can (and has) resulted in
rulings that punish musicians for exhibiting their influences and
using them to form a new kind of expression.101 In a copyright
regime like this, essentially any band could succeed on a claim
of infringement because most, if not all, genres of music have a
rich history of influence at this point in time.
Subconscious copying, and the ability of courts and juries to
conflate this with musical influence is something that concerns
musicians, and is an issue that relates to the application of copyright
law to music specifically. Music specifically requires a different kind
of test because of the unique aspects that form the artistic medium.
II: “THERE’S STILL TIME TO CHANGE THE ROAD YOU’REON”102:
WHYMUSIC SHOULDHAVE ITS OWN TEST
Music is a unique art form and is deserving of a different
standard and test when it comes to determining whether
copyright infringement has occurred. As the preceding case law
has shown, the courts have had a hard time deciding music
infringement cases.103 They have tried different tests, all of which
lead to inconsistent or contradictory applications and rulings of
the various standards used to determine infringement.104 This
Part addresses what makes music different as well as why the
current tests are better suited for other artistic mediums.
A. Music is Interpreted Differently and Should Therefore Be
Judged Differently
The human brain interprets music much differently than
other mediums, such as literature or film, that are also often
featured in copyright infringement cases.105 This warrants the
implementation of a different test when the court or the jury is
deciding on an infringement question.
The interpretation of music is different in its most basic
form; it is the only artistic medium we strictly hear. Copyright
scholars Margit Livingston and Joseph Urbinato have explored
101 See, e.g., Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx),
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97262, at *49 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015) (“Although the Thicke
Parties conceded access to ‘Got to Give It Up,’ the jury could have concluded that they
intended only to copy unprotected elements of the song in ‘Blurred Lines,’ but
accidentally or subconsciously copied protected elements.”).
102 LEDZEPPELIN,Stairway toHeaven, onLEDZEPPELIN IV (Atlantic Records 1977).
103 See supra Sections I.B–C.
104 See supra Sections I.B–C.
105 See Livingston & Urbinato, supra note 99, at 262.
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this notion.106 They argue that the issues of applying copyright
infringement doctrine to music stem from music’s unique
qualities, namely that “music is the only type of creative work that
humans experience primarily through the ear.”107 When analyzing
other art forms, such as literature or film, we have the benefit of
utilizing our other senses, and the two authors argue that this
should have a substantial impact on how the courts weigh elements
of an infringement suit such as “access, independent creation,
infringement, and the use of the experts.”108
Numerous scientific studies have been done that indicate
that the brain interprets and retains musical information in a
unique way.109 For example, concert pianist and author, Natasha
Spender, has opined that music is “one of the most highly
organized in respect of perceptual andmotor activities that occur
in sequence, each individual component occupying a very small
interval of time.”110 Studies have shown that the interpretation
and analysis of music requires both hemispheres of the brain,
with different aspects of musical composition attributed to
different areas.111 For example, “rhythmical, temporal, and
sequential components of music” have been attributed to the left
hemisphere while other aspects such as the perception of melody
and pitch have been attributed to the right.112 Making matters
even more interesting, other studies have suggested that this
can often vary from person to person.113
These studies indicate the complexity that goes into the
analysis of music as a unique medium. Due to how quickly music
occurs—we hear and interpret it in a continuous and
uninterrupted manner—our brains are essentially at a deficit
when we do it. This is as opposed to, for example, comparing two
paintings for infringement. Both paintings can be studied, side by
side, with different or unique qualities appearing to us visually,
something that cannot be done with two songs. As we have seen,
basing legal decisions on musical interpretations has proven to be
difficult due to these issues. A study regarding music perception
106 Id. at 227.
107 Id. at 230.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 262.
110 Natasha Spender, The Neuropsychology of Music: Apropos ‘Music and the
Brain’, 119 MUSICAL TIMES 676, 676 (1978); Natasha Spender Obituary, THE GUARDIAN,
https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2010/oct/22/natasha-spender-obituary [https://
perma.cc/H2QL-EK2X].
111 Hervé Platel et al., The Structural Components of Music Perception: A
Functional Anatomical Study, 120 BRAIN 229, 230 (1997).
112 Id.
113 Donald A. Hodges, Implications of Music and Brain Research, 87 MUSIC
EDUCATORS J. 17, 19–20 (2000).
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indicated how analyzing different aspects of musical composition,
on an individualized level, can be difficult.114 Subjects were asked
to perform tasks in a PET scanner, with some tasks, like
recognizing timbre,115 proving to be easier than others like those
involving pitch116 and rhythm.117 These test results are indicative of
issues that judges or jurors may have when asked to rule on a
particular aspect of a piece of music.
Further issues play into the difficulties judges or jurors
experience. For example, the reliance on the aural skills of fact
finders is problematic because those abilities might be lacking
due to tone deafness, as noted by intellectual property attorney,
J. Michael Keyes.118 Ultimately, someone that is tone deaf lacks
in the ability to properly perceive or remember musical
sounds.119 This kind of impairment could easily lead to improper
rulings and determinations of whether infringement occurred.
Additionally, in recent years and amidst countless infringement
suits in the music industry, the idea of “‘disguised’ infringement”
has come about, as discussed by intellectual property attorney
Mark Avsec.120 Avsec argues that the shear amount of copyright
infringement suits have confused judges and juries alike, and
that essentially too much thought is going into it—if pieces do
not sound alike on the surface, they are likely not similar.121 All
of these factors indicate how difficult it can be to analyze two
songs for the purpose of proving infringement, a process that
would be greatly simplified, for the benefit of the artist, with the
introduction of a new legal standard for music.
114 Platel et al., supra note 111, at 229, 234–37 (“Though many subjects realized
that the task involving timbre was easier, most of them said that this was only relative
and that the task demanded attention throughout scanning. The pitch task was felt by
all the subjects to require the most mental focusing relative to the other tasks. Rhythm
and familiarity tasks seemed to demand fewer attentional resources. The subjects
reports are consistent with the observed results and confirm that pitch and familiarity
tasks are not identical in terms of cognitive processing.”).
115 “[T]he quality given to a sound by its overtones: such as (a) the resonance by
which the ear recognizes and identifies a voiced speech sound, (b) the quality of tone
distinctive of a particular singing voice or musical instrument.” Timbre, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/timbre [https://perma.cc/LZX4-V6NL].
116 “The pitch of a note accords to the frequency of its vibrations.” Pitch, NAXOS,
http://www.naxos.com/mainsite/NewDesign/fglossary.files/bglossary.files/Pitch.htm
[https://perma.cc/6CLS-LE5A].
117 Platel et al., supra note 111, at 229, 236.
118 J. Michael Keyes, Musical Musings: The Case for Rethinking Music
Copyright Protection, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 407, 436–47 (2004) (“Tone
deafness or ‘amusia’ is the broad clinical term referring to a spectrum of maladies
effecting the brain and its ability to process music.” (footnote omitted)).
119 Id. (“[T]one deafness effects an individual’s ability to perceive, produce, or
remember musical sounds.” (footnote omitted)).
120 Avsec, supra note 16, at 343.
121 Id.
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B. Music Is Fundamentally Limited as Compared to Other
Mediums
Another key factor that sets music apart from other
artistic mediums is how fundamentally limited it is. Artists of
literary or dramatic pieces have an almost unlimited range of
options when it comes to crafting their work; a writer “has tens
of thousands of words to use in an innumerable variety,” and “[a]
painter has . . . hundreds of colors . . . and dozens of media in
which to render a work.”122 This is simply not the case for music,
and it is something that should be taken into account when
determining whether infringement occurred.
As copyright professors Margit Livingston and Joseph
Urbinato have pointed out, music as we know it today is heavily
dictated by the overall formal and tonal practices developed in
Western music tracing back to the 1800s.123 At a fundamental
level, music has adapted to and become limited by what is
pleasing to the human ear.124 These limits are all dictated by
tonality, which “may be defined as a musical theoretical concept
centered on one primary pitch or tone[,] . . . which at least seven
other pitches or chords gravitate away from and finally back
to.”125 These pitches are limited to a certain number of keys (both
major and minor), based off of which note is designated as the
“tonic” within the twelve note chromatic scale,126 and can then be
adapted into various “modes” by “start[ing] on a different scale
degree of the major scale.”127 In addition, there are also the
melodic minor and harmonic minor scales, which represent
variants of the natural minor.128
122 Livingston & Urbanito, supra note 99, at 263.
123 Id. at 241.
124 Id. at 262.
125 Id. at 240 (footnote omitted)).
126 Mark DeVoto, Key: Music, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britan
nica.com/art/key-music [https://perma.cc/NG89-MQG6] (A “[k]ey, in music, [is] a system
of functionally related chords deriving from the major and minor scales, with a central
note, called the tonic (or keynote). The central chord is the tonic triad, which is built on
the tonic note. Any of the 12 tones of the chromatic scale can serve as the tonic of a key.
Accordingly, 12 major keys and 12 minor keys are possible, and all are used in music.
In musical notation, the key is indicated by the key signature, a group of sharp or flat
signs at the beginning of each staff.”).
127 Modes, MUSICTHEORYFUNDAMENTALS, http://musictheoryfundamentals.com/
MusicTheory/modes.php [https://perma.cc/8SX3-KE72] (“Each mode starts on a different
scale degree of the major scale.”).
128 Willie Myette, Natural, Harmonic, and Melodic Minor, MUSIC THEORY
ONLINE (2016), https://musictheoryonline.com/natural-harmonic-and-melodic-minor/
[https://perma.cc/PKG3-ZR4V] (“The harmonic minor scale differs from the natural
minor scale in only one way—the 7th scale degree is raised by half-step. . . . When
playing the ascending form of the melodic minor scale, only the 3rd scale degree is
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To this day, all music draws from these basic
foundational elements, and the use of these elements is quite
important to the crafting of a piece of music. Scales are integral
to the development of a piece of music that would be appealing
to a listener.129 Out of scales, chords are built and sequenced,
creating progression and harmony.130 Once the artist has these
basic building blocks—as governed by these rules of Western
tonality—they can then develop unique melodies from
complimentary scale tones, creating harmonious arraignments,
and a pleasing listening experience overall.131
Musicians to this day can only draw from certain tonal
structures when it comes to writing music, and these rules that
govern music have been determined by what is pleasing to the
human ear. This is where the copying or infringement often times
becomes confused with either drawing on past music for the sake
of inspiration and influence or just by following along these existing
structures.132 Artists often use their influences to craft new and
unique music, and this has the potential of being confused with
copyright infringement.133 Another issue with not having a
separate test for music, is the fact that the musical work can be
judged on elements that ought not to be copyrightable, relating
back to the idea versus expression dichotomy. These tonal
structures that serve as foundational building blocks for music, are
not what makes one piece of music distinguishable from another.
Musical “borrowing,” as one could say, is something that
is fundamental to the creation of music, and something that has
been practiced for centuries. For example, the renowned
classical composer Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart did not simply
create all of his work from scratch.134 The composer crafted his
unique work by blending different elements of the styles of music
lowered by half-step. The scale is the same as the major scale with the exception of the
lowered 3rd. When descending, the scale reverts to the natural minor form.”).
129 Paul Hindemith & Arthur Mendel,Methods of Music Theory, 30 MUSICALQ.
20, 24–25 (1944).
130 In Methods of Music Theory, Paul Hindemith and Arthur Mendel explain
the basic theory behind harmony as follows: (1) “[t]he tonal unit for harmonic purposes
is known as the interval;” (2) “[t]he superior force that determines the progression of the
intervals is expressed in church modes” (a point that Hindemith argues and that has
adapted more to be rooted in physics); (3) “[t]he harmonic unit is known as the chord;”
(4) “[t]he units (Chords) are either found in nature ([through] major and minor triads) or
formed by inversion;” and (5) “[t]he progression of chords is determined by the root
chord.” Id. at 26.
131 Id.
132 As seen, arguably, in Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., LA CV13-06004
JAK (AGRx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97262, at *48–50 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015).
133 See supra Section I.D.
134 J. Peter Burkholder, Music Theory and Musicology, 11 J. MUSICOLOGY 11,
21–22 (1993).
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prominent in his day, such as dances, fanfares, and operas.135
This tradition has continued on to popular music today—just
think of all of the modern pop artists that are compared to or
draw their influence and inspiration from Michael Jackson. Not
to mention the fact that the majority of popular music seems to
have found a sort of formula for success—one that sees the use
of the same 4/4 timing as well as similar phrasing and melodic
sensibilities amongst countless artists.136
This blending of musical styles is something that has
always played a major role in music. It all relates back to the
limited nature of music itself, those basic tonal and chord
structures, and is something that could easily be mistaken for
“copying.” Despite this, themelody of a song, something thatmakes
the piece of music unique, is not solely defined by the tones and
chords used.137 The chords used, while they may be repeated in
works because of the limited nature of musical compositions, serve
as a stepping stone for the unique blending of melody and harmony
that amusician creates.138 It is in this unique blending that the true
“expression” lies in a musical piece. Courts should not be ruling on
specific elements of a piece alone, but rather should take account
of everything—chords, melodies, rhythm, and personhood—
together. These elements are rooted in the history of musical
composition and development, and ought to be considered in the
formulation of a test for musical copyright infringement.
C. Applications in Other Mediums
Finally, applications of the various standards for finding
copyright infringement in other art forms exhibit why music ought
to be judged by its own standard. By looking at how the court
thought about and ruled in cases involvingmediums such as books,
135 Id. at 22.
136 Joe Bennett,Wanna Write a Pop Song? Here’s a Fool-Proof Equation, WASH.
POST (June 27, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/06/27/
wanna-write-a-pop-song-heres-a-fool-proof-equation/?utm_term=.5bce9030f0e6 [https://
perma.cc/JGN9-LPXE].
137 Hindemith & Mendel, supra note 129, at 24–25. See Skidmore v. Led
Zeppelin, CV 15-3462 RGK (AGRx), 2016 Dist. LEXIS 51006, at *35 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8,
2016) (“The expert reports point out structural commonalities shared by both songs, but
striking similarity is an exceedingly high bar that requires a much greater showing. In
fact, Plaintiff ’ s experts admit that other works use ‘similar descending minor harmonic
patterns.’ Even though the expert also states that Taurus and Stairway to Heaven
‘depart from the traditional sequence in similar and significant ways,’ the fact remains
that the primary feature in both works is a common musical structure. Thus, the Court
cannot definitively say based on the evidence provided that the two works bear a striking
similarity.” (internal citations omitted)).
138 This notion will ultimately form the foundation of the Unique Quality Test,
see infra Part IV.
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art, film, television, and more, one can see how it is simply easier
and more natural to judge these mediums as opposed to music.
For example, in Baker v. Selden, the court dealt with a
claim of infringement in regard to a book that featured a ledger
system.139 Simply put, the court could actually look at the books
in question, examining and weighing the differences and
similarities between the two.140 Similarly, in Seltzer v. Green
Day, the band Green Day was accused of infringing on artist
Derek Seltzer’s drawing Scream Icon in their music videos and
stage backdrops; the court was able to study the artistic works
side by side, ultimately noting the transformative value of the
latter pieces.141 The Ninth Circuit could simply view the works
and see the physical changes between the two.142 Such
comparison is much more straightforward than comparing two
musical works at separate times by ear.
Cases like this exhibit the sort of detail that can arise
more expansively when one is seeing something rather than
listening to it. For example, in Ideal Toy Corporations v. Kenner
Prods. Div. of Gen. Mills Fun Grp, Inc., the court was tasked to
compare a set of toys that were allegedly infringing on Star Wars
toys.143 Naturally, the court was able to describe in great detail
based on what the judges saw, for example, “C–3PO . . . is a
humanoid robot of a gleaming brass- or gold-colored
metal[,] . . . [h]is metal plates overlap at various joints but do not
cover his stomach areas, through which complicated wiring is
displayed.”144 The court was able to reach a specific explanation
of what makes this toy unique.145
It is much harder to accomplish such specificity when
analyzing music. Though music can be broken into components
such as harmony, melody, and rhythm, these are not things that
necessarily ought to be deemed copyrightable when viewed in
isolation.146 Furthermore, Ideal Toy also relied on background
information, with the court going into the specific background of
the stories behind the particular sets of toys.147 This kind of
analysis is also seen in Denker v. Uhry, a case involving an
139 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100 (1880).
140 Id.
141 Seltzer v. Green Day, 725 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013).
142 Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1176–77.
143 Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods. Div. of Gen. Mills Fun Grp, Inc., 443 F.
Supp. 291, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
144 Id. at 297.
145 Id.
146 See supra Section II.B.
147 Ideal Toy Corp., 443 F. Supp. at 297.
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infringement claim in regard to novels that had become films.148
In this case, the court provided in-depth analysis of the plots of
each film, as well as dialogue, characters, and more.149 In both
Ideal Toy and Denker, the more straight-forward analysis lent
itself to the burdens of proving infringement—the court was
easily able to dismiss each claim at the summary judgment stage
without getting bogged down in the kinds of confusing and
uncertain deliberations seen in music cases.150 Similarly, in
Murray v. NBC, where an employee claimed that the network
had stolen his idea for “The Cosby Show,” the court looked
extensively into elements of the show such as “program format,
titles, set designs, theme music, stories, scripts, and art work”
as well as the overarching identity of the program, ultimately
affirming the district court’s decision to grant summary
judgment for the defendant. 151
A court simply does not have as much to digest when it
comes to music. While a musical work can be broken up into its
respective elements, those elements still are part of the song itself,
and are otherwise not necessarily elements that ought to be
considered protectable. Furthermore, other mediums such as
“audiovisual works,”152 allow the benefit of using multiple senses to
interpret and describe the piece in question. This differs frommusic,
which we can only hear and are forced to interpret as it plays.153
Overall, it is much more difficult for the court, and
humans as a whole, to compare two pieces of music to each other.
In contrast, one can put two books together, side by side, and
evaluate the similarities and differences at once. This is not
possible with music. Simply put, listening to two musical work
at once would be distracting and ultimately lead nowhere, which
forces judges and juries to listen one by one, which is difficult
enough to do. For the forgoing reasons, it is clear that music
needs to be judged by its own standard when determining
whether copyright infringement occurred.
148 Denker v. Uhry, 820 F. Supp. 722, 723, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
149 Id. at 724–28.
150 Id.; Ideal Toy Corp., 443 F. Supp. at 297.
151 Murray v. NBC, 844 F.2d 988, 993 (2d Cir. 1988).
152 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“‘Audiovisual works’ are works that consist of a series
of related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machine, or
devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying
sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in
which the works are embodied.”).
153 See supra Section II.A.
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III. STAIRWAY TOHEAVEN AND BLURRED LINES
Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin and Williams v. Bridgeport
Music, Inc. are prime examples that indicate a need for a new,
unique music copyright infringement test. Bridgeport in
particular, due to its ruling against Robin Thicke and Pharrell
Williams for their supposed infringement in their hit Blurred
Lines, has received considerable backlash from the music
industry and community, with over 200 musicians signing the
brief for the ongoing appeal.154 This ruling sparked a lot of
concern in the music industry, with musicians and producers
alike calling for reform to protect their ability as artists to draw
on musical influence and style.155 This Part explores the rulings
in Skidmore and Bridgeport in-depth, highlighting the issues
that are present in the proceedings and illustrating how the
“Unique Quality” test will rectify those issues.
A. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin
The Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin case, heard in the Ninth
Circuit, involved legendary rock band Led Zeppelin combatting
a claim that they had infringed on the song “Taurus” by the band
Spirit with their song “Stairway to Heaven.”156 The estate for
Randy Craig Wolfe, the guitarist of Spirit, offered some evidence
indicating that Led Zeppelin had allegedly infringed on the
song.157 Skidmore claimed, and Led Zeppelin refuted, that the
two bands had a history of performing together and had
interacted a number of times at festivals, giving Zeppelin the
opportunity to hear the song “Taurus” plenty of times.158
154 Legal Entertainment, Pharrell Williams ‘Blurred Lines’ Appeal Starts
Friday, FORBES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalentertainment/2017/10/
05/pharrells-blurred-lines-appeal-starts-tomorrow/#7396ffb32812 [https://perma.cc/4K
HU-7C6S]; Evan Minsker, “Blurred Lines” Appeal Gets Support from More Than 200
Musicians, PITCHFORK, (Aug. 30, 2016), http://pitchfork.com/news/67932-blurred-lines-
appeal-gets-support-from-more-than-200-musicians/ [https://perma.cc/F93B-ESKG].
155 Rawiya Kameir, Four Industry Experts Explain What’s Wrong with Current
Copyright Laws, FADER, (June 19, 2015), http://www.thefader.com/2015/06/19/music-
copyright-laws-robin-thicke-marvin-gaye [https://perma.cc/2UWQ-8KYX].
156 Skidmore v. Zeppelin, CV 15-3462 RGK (AGRx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
51006, at *1–7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2016). This suit was brought by “Michael Skidmore, as
trustee for the Randy Craig Wolfe Trust.” Randy Craig Wolfe was the guitarist and
songwriter for the band Spirit. This issue arises years later from the original release of
Stairway to Heaven as a result of Led Zeppelin releasing a remastered version of the
original album. Id.
157 Id. at *2, 6–7.
158 Id. at *4–5.
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Furthermore, plaintiffs offered a musical expert that
attested to the similarities between the two pieces of music.159 The
expert contended that both songs contained “repeated ‘A’ sections
consisting of a four-measure descending A minor guitar pattern,”
and that “[i]n both songs, the ‘A’ sections are separated by a longer
‘B’ section, or bridge.”160 The plaintiff’s expert admitted to some
differences, namely an extended introduction in “Taurus” and a
difference in repeated sections, but ultimately concluded that
“nearly 80% of the pitches of the first eighteen notes match, along
with their rhythms and metric placement” and noted an unusual
variation on “the traditional chromatic descending bass line.”161
The court employed the Ninth Circuit’s extrinsic and
intrinsic tests.162 While noting that the Ninth Circuit has never
set out a uniform set of factors to use while judging the music in
its extrinsic factual analysis, the court contended that “[s]o long
as the plaintiff can demonstrate, through expert testimony
that . . . the similarity was ‘substantial’ and to ‘protected
elements’ of the copyrighted work, the extrinsic test is
satisfied.”163 The court ultimately found that the similarities in
“Taurus” and “Stairway to Heaven” “transcend[ed] [the] core
structure” of the songs, despite the descending chord progression
being a “common convention” in the music industry.164
Specifically, the court noted that the progressions both appear
at the beginning of the pieces, “arguably the most recognizable
and important segments,” and that the lines are played “at the
same pitch, repeated twice, and separated by a short bridge in
both songs.”165 With this, the court found that the pieces were
similar enough to go onto to the intrinsic test which asks the jury
to assess the “concept and feel” of the two works.166 The jury
disagreed, finding that Led Zeppelin had not infringed.167
159 Id. at *7–8.
160 Id. at *8.
161 Id. at *8–9.
162 See supra notes 56–60 and accompanying text.
163 Zeppelin, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51006, at *49 (omission in original) (quoting
Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 2004)).
164 Id. at *50.
165 Id. *50–51 (citing Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 851).
166 Id. at *51 (quoting Scentsy, Inc. v. Harmony Brands, LLC, 585 F. App’x 621,
622 (9th Cir. 2014); Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1990)).
167 Kory Grow, Led Zeppelin Win in ‘Stairway to Heaven’ Trial, ROLLING
STONE (June 23, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/led-zeppelin-prevail-
in-stairway-to-heaven-lawsuit-20160623 [https://perma.cc/3PTW-N4FD].
312 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1
B.Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc.
Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., also decided in the
Ninth Circuit, offers another modern copyright infringement
case—albeit one with a completely different outcome. The estate
of Marvin Gaye alleged that Robin Thicke and Pharrell
Williams, composers of the song “Blurred Lines,” infringed on
Gaye’s song “Got to Give It Up.”168 The Gaye party offered a
number of musical experts that testified to the similarities
between the two pieces.169 For example, a musicologist contended
that several “substantially similar features” could be seen in the
two pieces—including signature phrase in main vocal melodies,
hooks, backup vocals, core theme, backup hooks, bass and
keyboard melodies, and unusual percussion choices—and that
these similarities surpass the realm of generic coincidence.”170
Defendants, on the other hand, argued that the only subject
matter protected by copyright would be in the musical
composition, and that other aspects such as “groove” or “feel”171
are not things that ought to be regarded as protected material.172
Interestingly, the court rejected the Gaye party’s
argument here, noting that they did “not offer evidence that the
copyrighted compositions encompass subject matter beyond the
lead sheets,” or the original copyrighted sheet music that
features the musical composition.173 During the court’s
dissection of the pieces, it analyzed each element of the song that
could be gleaned from the musical composition.174 After comparing
the expert analyses on both sides, the court found that there was
“a sufficient disagreement” over whether substantial similarity
was present, indicating that the ruling would go on to a jury to
conduct an “intrinsic” analysis.175 The court indicated that these
disputes dealt with “signature phrases, hooks, bass lines, keyboard
chords, harmonic structures and vocal melodies,” all of which are
168 Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 97262, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015).
169 Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182240 at *6–7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014).
170 Id. at *6–7.
171 Stephen Graham, Justin Timberlake’s Two-Part Complementary Forms:
Groove, Extension, and Maturity in Twenty-First-Century Popular Music, 32 American
Music 4, 452 (2014) (In describing groove-based music, the author found that “its surging
climaxes, its syncopations, and its moments of dynamic or textural release create rise-
and-fall and forward-directed tension” and “a sense of linearity and movement.”).
172 Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182240 at *17-18 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014).
173 Id. at *24.
174 Id. at *32–55.
175 Id. at *54.
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elements that are key to an “extrinsic test.”176 Furthermore, despite
defendant’s arguments that these are not protectable elements of
a work, the court referred to precedent that allows for a
combination of these elements to form expression.177
Ultimately, the jury ruled against Thicke and Williams,
finding that infringement did occur.178 As argued in an amicus
brief for the current appeal, while the songs do not share “a
sequence of even two chords played in the same order and for the
same duration,” and additionally that the songs feature entirely
different song structures and no lyrical similarities, the jury
found otherwise.179 The jury’s analysis here ultimately came
down to the groove of the song, and Thicke and Williams were
found guilty for this reason alone.180
C. Analysis and Issues
The contradictory rulings in these two cases are truly
perplexing, and are indicative of the problems that still prevail in
copyright infringement analysis today. Skidmore, though it
reached an arguably correct decision, indicates some of these
issues. First, based on the analysis of music theory and structure,
a music infringement case like this, given the evidence and
analytical dissection of the works, should not have survived the
extrinsic test employed by the court.181
In determining that the case ought to go to the jury, as a
result of passing through the court’s extrinsic test for similarity,
the court found that based on the chords used, their structure
and repetition, as well as the fact that they were played in the
same pitch, the songs were substantially similar enough to move
on to the trier of fact.182 This is particularly problematic in the
realm of music, and is ultimately allowing courts to rule on the
ideas behind music rather than the expression of it. Music is a
medium that is fundamentally different than other artistic forms
176 Id. (quoting Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1472
(9th Cir. 1992)).
177 Id. at *61–62 (citing L.A. Printex Indus., Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d
841, 848 (9th Cir. 2012); Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 847–48 (9th Cir. 2004)).
178 Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97262, at *147 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015).
179 Brief of Amici Curiae 212 Songwriters, Composers, Musicians, and
Producers in Support of Appellants at 2–3, Williams v. Gaye, CA No. 15-56880 (9th Cir.
filed Oct. 30, 2016) [hereinafter Brief for Amici Curiae], https://www.scribd.com/doc
ument/322595201/Brief-of-Amici-Curiae-212-Songwriters-Composers-Musicians-And-
Produce#fullscreen&from_embed [https://perma.cc/S5YE-DKCQ].
180 Id. at 3.
181 See supra Part II.
182 Zeppelin, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51006, at *61.
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that these tests are better suited for.183 Music is unique and
fundamentally limited by certain sets of tonal structures that have
been historically determined to be pleasing to the human ear.184
Ultimately, what makes a piece of music original is how an artist
takes these fundamental musical stepping stones and crafts a
unique melody while blending with these tonal structures.185
Based on how limited music is as an artistic medium, it
is unfair and problematic to assess factors such as tonal
structure and chord use as anything other than ideas that
should not be protected under copyright law. As the test stands,
musicians are clearly being punished by an unclear and
misguided series of tests, and ultimately for their use of musical
ideas rather than a clearly defined musical expression.
This is clear in both Skidmore and Williams. In
Skidmore, the two pieces of music passed through the extrinsic
test entirely based on musical ideas, namely the use of similar
chords and song structure.186 While the court asserted that this
copying of ideas is occurring at some kind of heightened level, it
ultimately fell back on the lackluster assertion that the circuit
has never drawn a clear line for this.187 The same can be said for
Williams, where the court allowed for a combination of ideas,
such as chords, notes, rhythms, and drum beats, to count as
expression, noting that the Ninth Circuit has refused to “narrow
the ‘large array of elements’ of which music is comprised to a
‘uniform set of factors’ whose similarity must be shown.”188 What
can be gleaned from this, is the fact that because of a refusal to
set a clear line between what is a musical idea and what is musical
expression, essentially any array of musical ideas can be viewed as
expressive by the court and passed along to a jury. In Skidmore,
this was done merely on the use of chords and structure, while
Williams involved a number of factors, all of which were contended
with by Thicke and Williams’ musical experts.189
Clearly, it is time for courts to draw a line between what
constitutes a musical idea and what constitutes musical
expression. As seen by these two cases, any number of different
183 See supra Part II.
184 Livingston & Urbinato, supra note 99, at 239, 240–41, 254.
185 Hindemith & Mendel, supra note 129, at 26; see supra Part II.B.
186 Skidmore v. Zeppelin, No. CV 15-3462 RGK (AGRx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
51006, at *49–50 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2016).
187 Id. at *49–50.
188 Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182240 at *62 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2014) (quoting Swirsky v. Carey, 376
F.3d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 2004)).
189 Skidmore, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51006, at *9, 35; Williams v. Bridgeport
Music, Inc., LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97262, at *20–31 (C.D.
Cal. July 14, 2015).
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musical factors and ideas can result in the copying
determination being passed along to the jury, and this is
particularly problematic. Skidmore andWilliams, initially, seem
like they should have different outcomes. The court noted in
Skidmore that Stairway to Heaven employed similar chords,
progression, and overall atmosphere and expression, and on the
other hand, inWilliams, the court sent the case to the jury mainly
because there was a disagreement between musical experts and
seemingly the court did not want to go against precedent and draw
a line for the distinction between idea and expression in music.190
Despite this, the respective juries found Led Zeppelin innocent and
Thicke and Williams guilty of infringement.191
The intrinsic aspect of the test does not call for the use of
an expert’s testimony or an objective analysis of the pieces of
music; rather, it relies on the overall feel of the piece.192 The
problem though is not only how vague this is, but also the fact
that music has historically relied on the use of influence and
blending of musical genres.193 Given the lack of instruction here,
a jury could be capable of determining that essentially any song
“feels” like another one. One could take any modern artist from
any genre of music194 and trace the artist’s sound to those that
came before, artists that influenced them individually or the
genre as a whole. With the logic given to juries that copying
occurred when a song “feels” like another one, literally any artist
could easily be accused of copyright infringement. The fact that
some get off the hook, like Led Zeppelin in Skidmore, is simply
unexplainable under these circumstances. Ultimately, the idea of
total concept and feel in the musical medium is clearly indicative
of a musical idea rather than the expression of a number of ideas,
a concept which is backed by the over 200 musicians that signed
onto Thicke and Williams’ appeal, and something that makes it
190 Skidmore, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51006, at *50; Williams v. Bridgeport
Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182240 at *54 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 30, 2014).
191 Skidmore, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51006, at *56; Kory Grow, Led Zeppelin
Win in ‘Stairway to Heaven’ Trial, ROLLING STONE (June 23, 2016), http://
www.rollingstone.com/music/news/led-zeppelin-prevail-in-stairway-to-heaven-lawsuit-
20160623 [https://perma.cc/3PTW-N4FD]; Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA
CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97262, at *147 (C.D. Cal. July 14,
2015); Daniel Kreps, ‘Blurred Lines’ Ruling Sliced to $5.3 Million, With a Catch,
ROLLING STONE (July 15, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/blurred-
lines-ruling-sliced-to-5-3-million-with-a-catch-20150715 [https://perma.cc/357R-QVTT].
192 Skidmore, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51006, at *51.
193 Burkholder, supra note 134, at 22.
194 Musical genres are “a unique category of composition with similar style,
form, emotion, or subject.” Genre, ONMUSIC DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.onmusic.org/
terms/1567-genre [https://perma.cc/Q7TG-NK59].
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clear that music, as a unique art form, requires a unique test for
determining whether infringement occurred.195
IV. SETTING ANEW STANDARD: THEUNIQUEQUALITY TEST
An analysis of the inconsistent and unclear applications
of the various copyright tests involving music exhibits the need
for a unique test when it comes to determining whether
infringement occurred. As observed earlier, courts have been
apprehensive to draw a clear line between what is an idea and
what is an expression in the realm of music.196 But in an artistic
medium that is so fundamentally limited compared to others and
built on influence and blending of previous musical elements,
there is a need for that line to be drawn. By failing to understand
the nature of music itself, courts have allowed artists to be
punished for infringing on musical ideas197 that should not be
deemed protectable under copyright law.
The Unique Quality Test would rectify this issue. It would
allow protection for musicians’ original musical expression, while
ensuring that artists would not be punished for employing the use
of musical influence. Several authors have recognized a need for a
regime change when it comes to the determination of music
copyright infringement, but have missed the mark on establishing
a clear test that draws a necessary line between idea and
expression. For example, some scholars have suggested the
implementation of a music-use compulsory license.198 Accordingly,
this would serve as a fee that musicians could pay based on “(1) the
amount of music borrowed, and (2) the number of phonorecords
produced by the borrower.”199 This solution, however, does not take
into account the fact that music is built on influence and borrowing
of styles and genres. This solution rests on an assumption that
musicians will purposely copy another piece of music, be aware of
this copying, and then pay the other artist accordingly. As
examined in this note, however, just because two pieces of music
sound similar, it does not mean they are. An artist could have
incorporated their influence or previous works in a unique way
that should not be considered infringement, and the compulsory
license test fails to take that into account.
195 Brief for Amici Curae, supra note 179, at 3.
196 See generally Skidmore v. Zeppelin, CV 15-3462 RGK (AGRx), 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 51006, at *9, 35 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2016); Williams v. BridgeportMusic, Inc., LACV13-
06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97262, at *20–31 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015).
197 See supra Section II.B.
198 See Keyes, supra note 118, at 439.
199 Id.
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On the other hand, others have made the argument that
“[c]ourts should be aware of music’s unique qualities when
shaping the legal doctrine governing infringement disputes to
ensure that plaintiff composers can adequately protect
themselves from plagiarism and defendant composers can fend
off unjustified attacks on their authorial integrity.”200 The
proponents of this methodology take a step in the right direction,
proposing an increased standard of “striking similarity” for
music cases—so striking that only copying could explain the
resemblance in the music—and offer that courts “should give
particular weight to musical experts’ analyses that perform a
pitch-by-pitch comparison of disputed works.”201 A heightened
standard like this could be beneficial in certain circumstances
where the chord use and melodic expression are extremely and
obviously similar, but in a case like Bridgeport, where the jury
ruled on the overall feel of the pieces, this standard still would
not be helpful.202 Adding “striking” to the substantial similarity
dichotomy does not do much to alleviate the vagueness of the
test, and a jury could still easily find that a feel or groove of a
song is strikingly similar without much to go on.
The Unique Quality Test would work to protect artists’
musical expression while shielding them from futile suits
involving elements of musical pieces that are clearly just ideas
that should not be protected under copyright law. This test
would hone in on what makes a particular song unique, what
signifies the artist’s true intentions and original forms of
musical expression. The test would take into account musical
ideas, but the ruling would ultimately never depend solely on
said ideas. In determining whether infringement occurred, the
court, or jury, or both would look at how an artist took the
unprotectable elements of music composition, such as chords
and structure, and arranged their own protectable melody
overtop, creating a blend of protectable and unprotectable
elements that form a unique musical expression. The test would
be applied at both stages of the infringement dichotomy—
whether copying occurred and whether there was an unlawful
appropriation of the work.203
The Unique Quality Test would alleviate the confusion of
determining whether two songs are substantially similar by
effectively replacing that qualifier at both stages of the inquiry.
200 Livingston & Urbanito, supra note 99, at 263.
201 Id. at 291–92.
202 See Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97262, at *51–52 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015).
203 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 472–73 (2d Cir. 1946).
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So, in an infringement suit featuring two songs, a judge would
still determine whether copying occurred as a matter of law, but
by utilizing the heightened Unique Quality Test. If the judge
determines that there was copying, the jury would be instructed
to make their determination of an unlawful appropriation of the
work at hand by applying the Unique Quality Test as well.
Looking at the Unique Quality Test through the lens of a
case that almost arose between musician Joe Satriani and the
band Coldplay further explains what the test is getting at and
how a court would apply it.204 In 2009, Satriani claimed that
Coldplay’s “Viva la Vida” contained “substantial, original portions”
of his 2004 instrumental song “If I Could Fly.”205 The case was
settled outside of court,206 but still serves as an excellent example
of possible infringement that could be found under the Unique
Quality Test. Beginning at fifty seconds into the song, Satriani
plays a melodic guitar solo over a set of four chords.207 Analysis of
this aspect of the song indicates that the chords themselves would
not be something that could be protected, but rather are a
progression that has been utilized countless times in music. A
particular chord progression, as discussed above, is something
that has been deemed pleasing to the ear over the course of
music history.208 There are only so many of these progressions
that could work, and therefore the progression itself is something
that cannot be protected.209 The guitar solo and melodic phrasing
that Satriani places overtop of the chords, however, is something
that would be protectable. Satriani has crafted this melody in a
way that has not been done previously and that blends with the
chords underneath it, creating a pleasing sound, indicating a
unique form of musical “expression.”
Coldplay’s “Viva la Vida” clearly exhibits the same chord
pattern—this can be heard from the beginning of the song.210 This
alone is not problematic. But once the lyricalmelody begins is where
we start to see that infringement could have occurred. Coldplay’s
204 Gil Kaufman, Coldplay, Joe Satriani Settle Copyright Infringement Case, MTV
(Sept. 16, 2009), http://www.mtv.com/news/1621614/coldplay-joe-satriani-settle-copyright-
infringement-case [https://perma.cc/WEU4-QU3J]; Daniel Kreps, Satriani’s “Viva La Vida”
Copyright Suit Against Coldplay Dismissed, ROLLING STONE (Sept. 16, 2009), http://
www.rollingstone.com/music/news/satrianis-viva-la-vida-copyright-suit-against-coldplay-dis
missed-20090916 [https://perma.cc/BH9B-SZJ6].
205 Kaufman, supra note 204.
206 Id.
207 See JOE SATRIANI, If I Could Fly, on IS THERE LOVE IN SPACE? (Epic Records
2004) at 0:49.
208 See supra Section II.B.
209 See supra Section II.B.
210 See COLDPLAY, Viva la Vida, on VIVA LA VIDA OR DEATH AND ALL HIS
FRIENDS (Parlaphone 2008) at 0:00.
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singer, Chris Martin, sings “I used to rule the world, seas would rise
when I gave the word” in the exact same melodic pattern as
Satriani’s guitar melody.211 Given that it can be shown that access
had occurred, which is likely given the status of Joe Satriani in the
rock music world, this would be enough to satisfy that infringement
had occurred under the Unique Quality Test. The way the melodies
are crafted to fit along the tonal structures in the two songs are
exactly the same; assuming copying has already been established,212
Martin’s later version clearly indicates an infringement of a
protectable element of Satriani’s song—the actual musical
expression, not just the chords or overall feel of the work.
Repp v. Webber is another example, as long as access had
been proven, of where infringement likely could have occurred
under the Unique Quality Test. In this instance, both pieces
utilize a similar chord structure, which we have seen is
something that ought not be protected under copyright law as a
musical “idea.”213 Like in the Satriani and Coldplay case,
however, the vocal melodies situated on top of the two are almost
exactly the same.214 If access could be established in this
instance, it is likely that infringement occurred due to the fact
that the unique aspects of the musical pieces, what make them
recognizable on their own, are almost exactly the same.
Had the courts applied the Unique Quality Test in
Skidmore and Williams, the outcomes would have been quite
different and would have provided a favorable outcome in terms
of protection for musicians. Infringement clearly did not occur.
After an introduction, “Taurus” goes into a descending chord
pattern that is similar to what we hear in the beginning of
“Stairway to Heaven.”215 Despite this slight similarity, Led
Zeppelin goes on to introduce a unique vocal melody overtop, as
well as varying instrumental arrangement that also blend
together with this basic chord pattern to create something
pleasing to the listener. These aspects of “Stairway to Heaven”
are not heard in “Taurus,” and are what make “Stairway” a
unique form of musical expression. Clearly, the fact that there
were similarities in the chords used should not have been
enough to send the case to the jury. Though the jury ruled in
211 Compare JOE SATRIANI, supra note 207, at 0:49, with COLDPLAY, supra note
210, at 0:13.
212 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
213 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
214 Id.
215 Compare LED ZEPPELIN, Stairway to Heaven, on LED ZEPPELIN IV (Atlantic
Records 1977) at 0:00, with SPIRIT, Taurus, on SPIRIT (Ode Records 1968) at 0:47.
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favor of Led Zeppelin, this could have easily gone the other way,
and there should not have been an opportunity for that to occur.
On the other hand, Williams would have resulted in a
favorable ruling for Thicke and Williams under the Unique
Quality Test. Ultimately, the jury ruling in this case relied on
the feel and groove of the two songs, and upon listening to the
two, this must have been due to a fairly similar drumbeat and
possibly based off of the use of falsetto216 vocals.217 Otherwise, as
Thicke and Williams’ lawyers attested to, there are no
similarities in melody, instrumental parts, or lyrical content.218
Overall tone and feel represents more of a musical “idea” rather
than “expression.” Given the fact that the court sent the case to
the jury only due to the difference in the opinions of experts,
rather than in Skidmore where the court indicated actual
similarity between the two pieces, it only bolsters the argument
that no unique aspects of Gaye’s work were infringed upon.219
“Blurred Lines,” while imploring a similar drumbeat and R&B
feel, presents its own unique vocal melodies and musical phrases
on top of the unprotectable feel of the song. Ruling otherwise
opens the door for countless similar rulings. If a simple
drumbeat is enough to find a ruling of infringement, any song in
any genre could result in a similar determination.
The Unique Quality Test would rectify the foregoing
issues for musicians—protecting their original forms of musical
expression while shielding them from fruitless lawsuits that
could result in rulings based solely on musical “ideas.”
Legislative action is not needed to implement the change, as courts
could simply administer the test on their own. As this note has
shown, the traditional Second and Ninth Circuit tests seem to fit
better with other kinds of artistic forms, and the Unique Quality
Test would specifically apply as a sort of heightened test for music.
Music is deserving of its own test, so amending the Copyright Act
to accomplish this would be too expansive, as it would then likely
apply to all other artistic mediums.
By continuing to employ a vague test, one where courts
have been hesitant to draw a clear line between what is a musical
idea and what is musical expression, courts have allowed for
rulings to occur that go against the fundamental aspects of
216 Falsetto, ONMUSIC DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.onmusic.org/terms/1378-
falsetto [https://perma.cc/JJ8T-YGDD] (last visited Oct. 2, 2017) (Falsetto refers to “[a]
technique in which a mature male voice can reach notes of the soprano or alto range.”).
217 Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 179, at 3.
218 Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 97262, at *66–67 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015).
219 Id. at *54.
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copyright law. It is foundational in copyright law that ideas are
not protectable elements. A study of music theory, however,
shows that an idea in music is different than that in other artistic
mediums. Musicians are vastly more limited in their craft than
others, and a court ruling there is infringement based on aspects
of music such as chord usage and tonal structure ignores what
makes music unique. Ultimately, courts need to be making these
determinations based on the original and unique qualities that
artists instill into their musical work—something that can be
accomplished with the Unique Quality Test.
CONCLUSION
Music is unique, and is thus deserving of a unique legal
standard. The Unique Quality Test would ultimately serve the
best interest of artists and musicians, allowing them to create
and produce music that is not only original, but also draws from
their influences. Music is fundamentally limited in its nature,
and musicians are always finding ways to build off of what
artists before them have done, adding their own creative tinge
to it in the process. When it comes to determining copyright
infringement, courts are not equipped with appropriate legal
tests and standards to deliberate over such a nuanced artistic
medium. With the Unique Quality Test, judges and juries would
be able to evaluate music in a more informed light, establishing
a clearer line for what copying really means when it comes to
music. Then ultimately the line between copying and influence
in music will not be so blurred.
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